

INTERNET DOCUMENT INFORMATION FORM

A . Report Title: The Development of U.S. National Strategy and it's Application in Bosnia

B. DATE Report Downloaded From the Internet 2/26 /98

C. Report's Point of Contact: (Name, Organization, Address, Office Symbol, & Ph #): US Army War College

D. Currently Applicable Classification Level: Unclassified

E. Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release

F. The foregoing information was compiled and provided by:
DTIC-OCA, Initials: gm **Preparation Date:** 2/26/98

The foregoing information should exactly correspond to the Title, Report Number, and the Date on the accompanying report document. If there are mismatches, or other questions, contact the above OCA Representative for resolution.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF U. S. NATIONAL STRATEGY AND ITS APPLICATION IN BOSNIA

Lieutenant Colonel Jerrold D. Weissinger

G-5, 38th Infantry Division (Mechanized)

The "Cyclone Division"

The Defense Strategy Course as presented by the U.S. Army War College, Department of Corresponding Studies, is a thought provoking and informative professional development course. The 6-month correspondence course introduces the student to the fundamentals and contemporary issues of U.S. National Security Strategy. Through a large volume of reading the student is required to identify and define: what is a national strategy and how is it developed? The student is also required to assess current U. S. Strategy in a designated part of the world. The papers, like this article, are limited in length. However, the knowledge and interest gained by taking this course is much greater. The following is a brief overview of the course material. All material quoted is a sample of the reading material provided as part of the course.

What is "National Strategy"?

National strategy is a plan for the coordinated projection of the elements of national power designed to attain the goals of national policies and or objectives. The development of national strategy is an art made up of many specific sciences. National power consists of a nations economic, political, psychological and military powers. The control and application of each of these elements may be required for a nation to achieve national policy goals. Each of the elements of national power constitute a complex individual area of study that contains various scientific methodologies and practices. These elements are used, to varying degrees, during both peace and war. Colonel (Ret.) David Jablonsky in his thesis on national power states that no single element is responsible for power. I believe that it is the coordinated application of the various elements that creates an effective national strategy.

Stephen M. Walt in his review essay "The Search for a Science of Strategy" attempts to gain insight into the evolution of the military mind by reviewing the writings of great military strategists contained in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, by Peter Paret. He states that the strategists over the years have failed to attain the "science of strategy" not because of the complexity of the subject, but because of the lack of a scientific method. He states that most writers on strategy have confused the scientific "product" (logically related propositions valid across time and space) with the scientific "process" (critical inquiry based on logic and the systematic treatment of evidence). His analysis provides some interesting insights into the perspectives and biases of past writers. However, through his analysis he concludes that strategic thought could be scientific if barriers to systematic inquiry in this field were eliminated. The barriers to the systematic development of national strategy, in particular military strategy, according to Walt, are the following: secrecy, the politics of self interests, interservice rivalry, opposition to innovation and hostility to critical evaluation. This is the basic premise that I feel is wrong. The elimination of these barriers would make the collection and evaluation of strategic alternatives easier. However, the formulation of effective national strategy involves the coordinated application of the various elements of national power as they apply in the context of the situation. This level of complexity along with the uncertainty of the dynamics of international politics makes the development of effective national strategy truly an art.

19980316 010

Perhaps, once further developed, the evolving "Chaos Theory", as described by Steven Mann, will provide a scientific process for the formulation of strategic thought. More appropriately called "nonlinear dynamics" the theory applies best to the domain of national strategy (multiple players) as opposed to the more specific formulation of military strategic and operational strategy. The world, in all of its complexity, is destined to be "chaotic" (non linear) because the multiplicity of human policy actors in the dynamical system have such widely variant goals and values. Nonlinearity, according to James Gleik, in his book entitled *Chaos*, means that the act of playing the game has a way of changing the rules. In simpler terms: there are no single right answers in national strategic policy, and the various players in the situation do not always behave in a manner "logical" from our perspective. According to Mann, life is too complex to be described by the interaction of a few simple variables. Self-organized criticality, an important off shoot of the chaos theory, has some interesting applications in the formulation of a more accurate framework to describe the current world dynamics.

Self-organized criticality is defined as large interactive systems that are perpetually organizing themselves to a critical state in which a minor event starts a chain reaction that can lead to catastrophe. However, it is noted that not all events lead to a catastrophe. Composite systems never reach equilibrium but instead evolve from one metaphysical (temporarily stable) state to the next. This paradigm of criticality highlights the disproportionate effects that seemingly minor actors can provoke. According to Mann, the more traditional models applied to international politics lead us to overestimate our influence on events and discount the ability of all but the major players to have a decisive impact on events.

Although much work is still to be done relative to the development and validation of the Chaos and Criticality paradigms, these theories have the potential to move the art of national strategy development further into the scientific realm.

Three prime examples that demonstrate the various elements of national power, and how they interrelate are the War in Vietnam, the War in Southwest Asia (Desert Storm) and the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

Many of the strategists express the belief that military strategy must, or should be, the extension of a nation's political strategy. In *On War*, Clausewitz defines war by using a conceptual trinity of (1) primordial violence, hatred and enmity; (2) the play of chance and probability; and (3) war's element of subordination to rational policy. It is perhaps the third element of the trinity that explains what Clausewitz meant by his famous phrase "war is a continuation of politics by other means". According to Edward Villacres and Christopher Bassford's article entitled "Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity", many modern authors misquote the original trinity and some in fact use the misquoted paradigm to discount all of Clausewitz's theories. I believe that Clausewitz created a valid and useful paradigm (the "remarkable trinity") for the evaluation of national strategy as it relates to a nation's motive for conducting war.

During the Vietnam War, U.S. military and political strategy were not aligned. The military strategy, which was in constant turmoil, was not an extension of our nation's political strategy or national will. This was a significant factor in the failure of both of these strategies. In contrast, during Desert Storm, President Bush went to great lengths to align world political support for the [United Nations] military strategy applied against Iraq. This military strategy was applied in conjunction with economic strategy (embargoes) thus making it even more effective.

The economic dimension of national power is considered by Michael Brown in "The Economic Dimensions of Strategy", to be the key to the U. S. development of an effective overall integrated strategic approach to national security. Brown correctly states that economic policies can serve strategic ends in five ways: to enhance regional stability, to achieve leverage over the policies of other countries, to increase the capabilities of allies, to reduce the capabilities of adversaries, and to engage in signaling. However, he stated that economic warfare, at the time the article was written, was not a practical economic strategy with respect to the Soviet Union. He confined his view of economic warfare to the principle of denial. It is my contention that the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), whether technically feasible or not, was an effective form of economic warfare and was instrumental the economic collapse of the Soviet Union. The system, if deployed, would have rendered the Soviet

strategic nuclear offensive capability ineffective. The competition of keeping up with U.S. military technology development was too much of a burden for the Soviet economy. The collapse of the Soviet economy before the USSR disintegrated called into question the Soviets superpower status because it could no longer afford to sustain an extensive array of arms and aid relations, according to Colonel (Ret.) Jablonsky.

In a world of ever increasing complexity developing a national strategy that coordinates the use of all of our nation's elements of national power becomes critical to securing our national interests. It is the synchronization of the various complex elements of national power into a cohesive strategy that raises the development and execution of national strategy to an art.

How is "National Strategy" developed?

U. S. National Security Strategy is developed, by constitutional design, through the coordinated efforts of the executive and legislative branches of our government. Joint Publication O-2 states that the President of the United States, advised by the National Security Council, is responsible to the American people for the national security unity-of- effort. Each administration brings with it a vision for the direction of U. S. National Security Strategy and a management style for how to get there. The guidelines established in the constitution only define the powers vested in the executive. The framers of the constitution, concerned that the president not become too powerful, created the system of checks and balances. Per article 2, section 2, of the constitution, the president is the Commander and Chief of the Armed Forces, has the sole authority to negotiate treaties with foreign countries, and has the power to appoint and remove ambassadors and other officials. However, he can not perform these duties alone. He is required to gain the consent and confirmation of the Senate to establish treaties and appoint officials respectively. The most significant check on presidential power is the exclusive congressional power to raise and obligate funds (the power of the purse). It is this congressional responsibility that supports the need for "congressional oversight" of the executive's national policy actions.

With the increase of America's role in the international arena, the President is authorized to make "executive agreements" which are formal obligations that have the power of law but do not require senatorial approval. Congressional oversight on these actions is less formal, usually involving the authorization of funds to carry out the agreements.

The core of the strategy development and coordination system used today, is the National Security Council (NSC) System, created by the National Security Act of 1947. The members of the NSC staff, along with the president's personal staff, do not require congressional confirmation. The members of the National Security Council, convened and chaired by the President, are the key individuals in making national security strategy.

The President, based on management style and personal preference, determines the roles and responsibilities for his staff. He defines the role his NSA and cabinet heads will take in the development of national strategy. The roles for the key positions of Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and the NSA must be clearly understood to avoid policy conflict. In the 49 years since the creation of the NSC, the various Presidents have taken a variety of approaches with respect to the role of the National Security Advisor. Based on the management style of the president and the personality of the NSA, the role the NSA has played has varied from administrator... to coordinator... to counselor... to agent. The NSA, with his staff, must coordinate the actions of the NSC, and Interagency Work Groups, with the cabinet, to facilitate the development of a cohesive national security strategy.

In recognition of the importance of the economic element of our national power President Clinton established the National Economic Council on 25 January 1993 with Executive Order 12835. The Council was established to coordinate the economic policy-making process with respect to domestic and international issues. The order also states that the Secretary of the Treasury will continue to be the senior economic official in the executive branch and the President's chief economic spokesperson.

Once the administration has developed a particular policy and respective strategy, it should be coordinated with the appropriate congressional staffs to insure it will be supported for necessary funding

and if necessary confirmation. Coordination throughout the development process will make for better policy and congressional cooperation.

The national interests that are the aim of our strategy have not changed a great deal from the Roosevelt to the Clinton administrations. Roosevelt summarized the nation's wants as survival, genuine independence, and rising prosperity. Bill Clinton expresses the objectives of his administration's strategy as enhancing our security, promoting our prosperity, and promoting democracy. Although the goals of our national strategy have not changed a great deal over the last 50 years, the methods we have employed to attain them have been numerous and have been altered frequently. Two major competing principles of strategy formulation deal with the manipulation of the factors of cost and risk. A strategy that minimizes risk (by countering all actions contrary to our interests), maximizes cost, conversely a strategy that minimizes cost (selectively deals with actions contrary to our interests), maximizes risk. Over the past 50 years America, as a nation, has changed approaches almost as many times as we have changed administrations.

With these changes in our strategy direction, the need to document our strategy focus and plan becomes vital. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 requires that the President submit an annual articulation of national grand strategy. President Clinton, in compliance with Act, submitted a report entitled "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement", dated February 1995. The report clearly lays out the President's vision and direction for our National Strategy. However, much of the report reads like a commercial for the accomplishments of the administration. There is no reference to the previous report submitted by the administration or of previous U. S. Strategies.

Edward Filiberti, in his article, "National Strategic Guidance: Do We Need a Standard Format?", states that standard formats help to facilitate effective communications. He further states that because there are no formalized decision criteria or standard formats for issuing strategic guidance, the thoroughness and quality of that guidance can vary substantially from document to document, from crisis to crisis and from administration to administration.

A great deal of turbulence in the development of our national strategy occurs when we change administrations, especially if the change includes a change in the administration's political party. Aaron Friedburg, in his article, "The Making of American National Strategy, 1948 - 1988", details the planning processes followed in an administration's development of national security strategy. He defines the efforts and the results of initial, mid-course and end-of-term efforts. Initial efforts, usually created by a brand new team of experts, tend to have the most affect on defining national policy direction and efforts. Mid-course exercises address changes to, or correct deficiencies in, the initial administration plan. End-of-term exercises are an attempt to leave a mark on the future, and mostly go unnoticed, unless the administration is re-elected. These "product life cycle" phases of administration strategic planning exercises, make the development of a standard strategy report format all the more critical. Edward Filiberti proposes that to facilitate the formulation of "comprehensive strategic guidance for interagency coordination", the format should include eight "essential elements". A review of his proposed elements reveals a strong similarity to the five paragraph operations order, which is engraved in all military minds. Filiberti states that what remains to be done is to find a way to best package the essential elements of information into a format acceptable to the NSC and federal departments and agencies. I believe that it would be extremely beneficial if the format also contained a section that ties the new strategy back to the last strategy, even if the last strategy was from a previous administration. Identifying policy directional changes would do a great deal to smooth out the dramatic shifts in our strategy, priorities, and focus for national security.

Thorough coordination between the executive and legislative branches during all stages of strategy development will produce better, more consistent policy and create a single "American voice" to the world. This, I believe, was the intent of the framers of the constitution when they designed the system of distributed powers that drive our government today.

An evaluation of current "US National Strategy" (May 1996)

The Current Situation in the Balkans

The Balkan Peninsula, often called the Powder Keg of Europe, has been a region of turmoil since as far back as 148 BC when the Romans started their 500 year rule of the area. The continual turmoil has surfaced in this century in 1912, with the First Balkan War; in 1913, with the Second Balkan War; in 1914 with WW I; in 1939 with WW II; and most recently, in 1990, with the collapse of the Communist Government of Yugoslavia.

The Balkan Peninsula is defined by the geographical region bound by the Sava and Danube Rivers on the North, the Adriatic Sea on the West, the Aegean Sea and Sea of Marmara on the South, and the Black Sea on the East. The region includes most of the former Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and European Turkey. Some analysts include the countries of Hungary and Romania in the area defined as "the Balkans", although they are not on the peninsula proper, due to their ethnic origins and history. The collapse of the Communist Government in Yugoslavia has created the "nation-states" of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo), and Macedonia. The term "nation-states" is used here to describe the entities that have surfaced in the region. However, it is not technically correct. The reason it is not is the root of the current, as well as historical origins of the conflict in the region. William Johnsen, in his report for the Strategic Studies Institute entitled "Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy" defines the terms "nation" and "state". He notes that the terms are not synonymous, and the difference takes on important distinctions in the Balkans. A state is a legal and political organization, with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens. A nation is a community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness. Thus, Johnsen points out, while it is possible for a "nation" and a "state" to correspond (hence the term nation-state), the two entities do not have to coincide. In the Balkans the conflict over the centuries has been caused by the inability to make nations (communities of people) align with the geographic boundaries of states (political entities).

Ethnic identity, that creates the formation of nationalism, is a key ingredient in the Balkan turmoil. The major religious divisions in the area are Roman Catholicism, Greek, Serbian and Eastern Orthodoxy, and Islamic Muslim. The ethnic diversity, and more importantly ethnic distribution, of the Balkans is the major roadblock to development of "harmonious" nationalist movements. Hence, the successful alignment of national and state boundaries has not been accomplished.

The rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire (mid 1400s-late 1800s), and the numerous conflicts caused by the various uprisings in the region during this century, caused ethnic migration and relocation in the Balkans. The resulting ethnic distribution, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, has caused a geographic patchwork of ethnic diversity. With the collapse of the "state" of Communist Yugoslavia, the diverse ethnic groups located in Bosnia-Herzegovina were unable to continue to coexist in the form a state, due to the fact that they refuse to identify themselves as a "nation". The dissolution of the Yugoslav Communist Party in 1990 gave birth to several succession movements. Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence in mid-1991, and subsequently Bosnia and Herzegovina in March of 1992. Serbia and Montenegro have remained part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina was 44% Muslim, 32% Serb, and 17% Croat. While ethnic groups were more geographically mixed in Bosnia and Herzegovina than in other republics, Muslims generally inhabited urban areas, while Serbs lived in the countryside. As a result, Bosnian Serbs were in the majority in some 55% of the national territory.

Most Bosnian Serbs boycotted the Referendum on Independence in March of 1992, and ethnic clashes broke out. On April 6, 1992, Serb artillery began the bombardment of Sarajevo, the multi-ethnic capital. The conflict grew rapidly and increasingly brutal as Bosnian Croat, Bosnian Serb, and the Muslim-dominated Bosnian government forces battled each other. United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) troops were deployed to the area to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid. NATO air strikes began on August 30, 1995 after a Serbian mortar attack on Sarajevo killed 38 people at an

outdoor market.

In September 1995, after almost 3.5 years of fighting, a strengthened American-led diplomatic peace initiative, combined with two weeks of a countrywide NATO bombing campaign against Serb military targets, created the backdrop for a cease-fire and the conflict's most promising peace talks between the three warring parties. On November 21, 1995, after a three week American-brokered peace conference in Dayton, Ohio, the presidents of the three rival Balkan states agreed to a peace accord, ending four years of terror and ethnic cleansing. On December 17, 1995, the three leaders formally signed the accord in Paris, paving the way for the full deployment of 60,000 NATO peacekeeping troops, which included 20,000 Americans.

U.S. Interests and Objectives (ENDS) for the Region

The national interests of the United States, that shape our national strategy are to insure the security of our people, their way of life, and their prosperity. To support these goals the United State's Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement states that we will protect existing and developing democratic nations. We will support and encourage the development of new democratic governments with market driven economies. The United States also supports the protection of human rights and freedoms. Democratic nations, with market driven economies, tend to have a better record with respect to human rights protection. They also provide the United States, as well as the rest of the world, with economic opportunity through the free operation of open and vibrant markets. Therefore, the resulting priority of U.S. strategy toward third world nations should be to promote non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ecological sanity, and human rights. Current U.S. policy is to selectively "engage" threats to our national interests, based on their geostrategic importance, and to "enlarge" opportunities that support our interests.

The administration has stated that NATO remains the anchor of American engagement in Europe. Active engagement in Europe is essential to the successful accomplishment of protecting our national interests. Based on this, the conflict in the Balkans takes on new meaning. Both Greece and Turkey are member nations of NATO. They are historically opposed in the struggles that have existed in the Balkan region. Further violence and fighting in the region, and the subsequent spreading of the conflict outside of the region, could involve both Greece and Turkey, disrupting NATO and eventually change, perhaps destroy, the evolving peace and prosperity that is evolving out of the resolution of the cold war. Therefore, U.S. interests in the area are to first, contain the fighting, then, to stop the fighting and help the various parties find a peaceful way to resolve their differences. However, it is imperative that the U.S. strategy include a multilateral approach. Peaceful resolution of the regional conflict that exist in the Balkans will require the influence of all of the major powers, to include the Russians. Once this is accomplished, successful "states", if not "nation-states" can be formed.

Stephen Metz, in his report entitled "America in the Third World: Strategic Alternatives and Military Implications", describes a "basic philosophy" with respect to American foreign and national security policy concerns. The philosophy focuses on how we define national interests. Called political realism, the philosophy is based on the fact that international politics is power politics. He states that a coherent strategy matches power and geostrategic interests, which include tangible concerns such as access to sea lanes or raw materials, and tangible objectives, especially preservation of a balance of power among the world's great powers. Realists recognize that although the Third World has been the source of most of the instability and conflict in the modern world, they consider it unimportant. According to Metz, they believe that the ability of a state to cause damage is proportionate to its power.

Although it is true that we, as a nation, must show constraint, or selectivity with respect to our "engagement" in the world this straight line, linear approach to strategic policy development has some serious shortfalls. On June 28, 1914, in the city of Sarajevo, a Bosnian Serb by the name of Gavrilo Princip, executed the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, setting off the First World War. This is just one example of how a third world terrorist group, the Serbian Black Hand, can dramatically affect world history.

In the post cold war world, the relative importance of events that require U.S. intervention, either

unilateral or multilateral, needs to be assessed based on a more flexible approach to strategy development. Perhaps theories such as non-linear dynamics (the Chaos Theory) or self organized criticality, that look at the many "players" in the world, rather than just the majors, would be better tools to evaluate relevance. Violent conflict in the Balkans, although a third world region, has the potential to develop into a serious "geostrategic" problem for U.S. National Security.

Concepts (WAYS & MEANS) for Protecting Interests and Obtaining Objectives

To contain and stop the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina the U.S. must employ the political and military elements of its national power. Political pressure must be used to develop multilateral support for peacekeeping efforts. Military power and leadership must be applied in support of the peacekeeping efforts. However, it is critical that the effort maintain as large a multilateral component as possible. Along with NATO support, Russian involvement must be pursued to insure that all interests are represented.

To accomplish the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord the United States has already successfully applied several aspects of its national power. Military power was applied to assist the UNPROFOR in its humanitarian efforts. Political and psychological power were applied to bring the leaders of the three warring factions to the negotiating table. Now American military power will be applied to administer the peace through the multilateral NATO peacekeeping force.

Once the fighting has been stopped U.S. economic power will be required to assist in the establishment of a viable economy in the region. Commerce Secretary Ron Brown, and 31 top U.S. corporate executives were on a mission to find specific ways to utilize U.S. economic power to stabilize the region when their plane crashed in Bosnia, killing all on board.

In late November, 1995 President Clinton addressed the nation and asked both the public and Congress to support sending 20,000 U.S. troops to Bosnia for a peacekeeping mission. Government officials have stated that the deployment will last about 12 months and cost about \$1.5 billion. It was further stated that U.S. troops could be withdrawn immediately if the treaty breaks down.

William Johnsen, in "Deciphering the Balkan Enigma...", states that the historical development of political institutions in the Balkans offers little optimism for a dramatic improvement in the political conditions. I don't believe that the American mind can conceive what 2000 years of instability, authoritarianism, and violence can do to a region and its people. The efforts in the Balkans are not going to be short term. U.S. involvement is critical, both from the political and military power perspective. This message must be conveyed to the American public.

Efforts are underway to use the many facets of U.S. national power; political, psychological, economic and military. However, to maximize our psychological power and provide a solid base for the use of our political, military and economic powers the American people and the congress need to be brought on board with respect to the size and importance of the commitment.

References

1. Jablonski, David, Col (Ret.) "Why is Strategy Difficult", Opening Presentation to the February 1992 Conference on Strategy at the U.S. Army War College.
2. Walt, Stephen, M., "The Search for a Science of Strategy", *International Security*, Vol. 12, No. 1, Summer 1987, pp. 140-165.
3. Paret, Peter, *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Princeton University Press, 1986.
4. Mann, Stephen, R., "Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought", *Parameters*, Vol. 22, No. 3, Autumn 1992, pp. 54-68.
5. Clausewitz, Carl von, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Sir Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton,

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.

6. Villacres, Edward, J., and Bassford, Christopher, "Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity", *Parameters*, Vol. 25, No. 3, Autumn 1995, pp. 9-19.
7. Drew, Dennis, M., and Snow, Donald M., *Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems*, Air University Press, August 1988, pp. 63-78.
8. Clinton, William, J., "Organization of the National Security Council", The White House, January 20, 1993.
9. Clinton, William, J., "Executive Order 12835 of January 25, 1993, Establishment of the National Economic Council", *Federal Register*, Vol. 58, No. 16, January 27, 1993, pp. 6189-6190. USGPO.
10. Starobin, Paul, "The Broker", *National Journal*, April 16, 1994, Vol. 26, No. 16, pp. 878-883.
11. Ambrose, Stephen E., "The President and Foreign Policy", *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1991, Vol. 70, No. 5, pp. 120-137.
12. Clinton, William, J., *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, USGPO, February 1995.

[Back to Table of Contents](#)

[Next Page](#)